Clegg is positioned, in contrast, as the empirical cart-horse, who manned the public enquires and built the academic institutions through which Flanders' ideas could flow. This is how Clegg, in his modesty, often presented the partnership. 'He was more of a theorist, and he was a slow worker, and a bit of a perfectionist, whereas I'm a fast 3 workers and more slapdash'.
INTRODUCTION
The first two assumptions about the Flanders and Clegg partnership are interwoven.
But how great was Flanders' intellectual influence and when did it begin? Or, to put the question another way, what was Clegg's independent theoretical contribution to British IR and is it possible to isolate this? My argument below is that we can do so both by topic and chronology. For instance, according to Clegg's 'Introduction' to Flanders' (1975, p.7) first book of essays:
With the publication of The Fawley Productivity Agreements in 1964, Allan Flanders became almost overnight the outstanding theorist of industrial relations in Britain and, many would say, in the world.
But the earliest of these academic essays was written in 1961, a year after Clegg's body of work discussed here; even if, as the older man, his political and journalist writing extended much further back. In Kelly's version, Flanders drew the plan of the building while Clegg did the empirical and academic spadework. This interpretation has the merit of at least putting someone's ideas at the genesis of modern IR, if not those of Clegg. Even an admirer, like Brown (1998, p.848) , depicts a similar division of labour:
Leaving the Communist Party, Clegg committed his remarkable intelligence to the factual analysis of organized labour, leaving the more theoretical aspects to Flanders in a close division of effort which, after Flanders' death in 1973 , he was to have difficulty shaking off.
Clegg was exceptionally modest and unassuming, by all accounts, while being very penetrating intellectually. Moreover, 'theory' was regarded by him with some suspicion, in reaction against his early Communist period. Once more, Brown (1998, p.849 ) sketches this mind-set:
A view once expressed by Clegg was that 'an ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory' and there can be no doubting that his published life's work amounted to a great weight of books containing little discussion of theory and a vast amount of sparely expressed fact. It was not, as we shall see, that he was unaware of the theoretical underpinnings of his work; it was rather that he was painfully aware that the study of organized labour has long been awash with, in varying degrees, plausible and optimistic theories, which have usually been sustained by little more than myth and ignorance'.
Brown's account of 'philosophical underpinnings' already suggests a hinterland of theory, supporting the empirical work. And the popular image of Clegg as a naïve empiricist, somehow does not ring true with what we know of the man and his early life and influences. As Brown puts it, succinctly but also slightly cryptically: 'Perhaps as a result of his rebellion against both Christianity and Marxism, Clegg exhibited both an antipathy to dogma and a strong sense of morality ' (p.849) . Some key elements of Clegg's early intellectual formation are crucial here.
First, Clegg's father was a highly itinerant Methodist minister, who exposed him to both a powerful religious and moral influence and, very likely, an existential insecurity occasioned by constant resettling in very different communities from posh central Glasgow to industrial Lancashire.
ii These influences were very likely intensified by attending Kingswood Methodist boarding school outside Bristol from the age of 13. Next, Hugh Clegg joined the Communist Party (CPGB) while still in the sixth from and remained an active committed member for over a decade, through his time at Oxford and the intervening years in the army, leaving only in 1947. This was hardly a brief adolescent fad. And it was made all the more intense by the fact that Clegg's elder brother, Arthur was at once a major influence on his early life and a Cole set up this thing about industrial democracy. It was a Fabian group, and asked me if I would be the rapporteur of it, and I agreed. And then at some point I produced the draft of a pamphlet. And he was very upset about it, and he drafted another one. We had strongly different views, you see. It was a matter of compromising…The source of disagreement was that I was pressing this idea that proper industrial democracy was the development of trade unionism and collective bargaining in other directions, and he was a workers' control chap'. Cole's place in the pre-history of IR is well-known. Clegg belonged to the famous 'Cole group' as an undergraduate and rejoined him at Nuffield, but still suggested 'he wasn't a major influence'. He points instead to the role of Chester who as Master of
Nuffield was also his supervisor and who suggested the subject of London Transport for a research thesis.
And I worked with that for about a year…and I suppose I had it ready sometime in the spring of 1949, and he showed it to Cole and said "would this get the D.Phil.?" and Cole said "no; he was afraid he'd give it a B. Litt. With regret that he couldn't do more" and so Chester said "well, lets forget about that", and went around to see Richard Blackwell'.
vi And so began a long publishing association. In 1949, Chester was also instrumental (with Cole) in securing Clegg a fellowship at Nuffield:
I had by this time cut my links with the Communist Party. The reasons for it were both academic and political. Marxist economics and dialectical materialism had been undermined for me by the teaching of my philosophy and economics tutor; and the behaviour of the Soviet Union in the post-war world disillusioned me about Communism as an ideal form of government and social organisation. So when Chester told me he was proposing to nominate me for a fellowship at Nuffield College, and wanted to know, before he did so, whether I was a member of the Communist Party, I could answer with a clear conscience that I was not, and had ceased to pay dues to the party a couple of years ago. Thus, at this early point in his career, Clegg has pricked the bubble of socialist dreams and begun to map a more prosaic route to industrial democracy. At the same time, he was trampling on the hopes of his younger self.
Industrial Democracy and Nationalization (1951).
The Even so 'workers certainly do not see the interests as radically changed by nationalization' (p.65), just as he had found at London Transport. Indeed, 'a sense of partnership' was just as likely to be found among progressive private employers (p.67). And once more, joint consultation is a disappointment, especially on issues of production and efficiency, notwithstanding 'a general level of moderate achievement'.
Clegg repeats the case for a national wages policy, as part of the 'progress towards equality'. 'Every extension of socialism makes it more essential that the government should set up some body to compare the demands made by, and increases granted to, every group of workers' (p.117).
By now, Clegg has toughened his stance on Communism, which was regarded as misguided but fairly harmless in the London Transport study.
One of the most potent causes of inter-union conflict, and of conflict within unions…Communists put the interests of the U.S.S.R. before those of their own country and are therefore regarded almost as enemies of the state…the complaint against the Communists is that they do not play the game, and they regard any means as justified if it leads towards their social revolution (p.97).
This said, Clegg recognises, 'that some of the most competent and conscientious trade union leaders, at every level' (p.97) are Communists, but still doubts whether they are a principal cause of unofficial strikes. While 'strikes in nationalized industries are not an advertisement for socialism…not even a Communist can manufacture a strike without a grievance' (p.99).
x In short, the biggest problem with Communism in IR, apart from its dubious motives, allegiances and methods, is its damaging impact on the cohesion and efficacy of trade unionism and hence on industrial democracy.
Communism weakens unions as an effective democratic opposition and makes it
harder for them to take on legitimate responsibilities. Even so, Clegg explicitly rejects moves 'to suppress Communists…because it is a severe limitation of liberty, and because the difficulty of defining a Communist always involves the extension of repression beyond their numbers' (p.139).
Speaking as a socialist to fellow socialists, Clegg's main practical recommendation is a decentralisation of management to increase industrial democracy at the place of work. By this logic, 'industrial democracy consists, in part, of the opposition of the trade unions to the employer, and, in part, of the attempt of the employer to build his employees into a team working together towards a common purpose' (p.121). For now, he is prepared to entertain the 'democracy of common' purpose at the level of the 'team' or establishment, even while he rejects it at the level of industry. And he is still optimistic that nationalised industries should be able 'to attain a standard of management above that of private industry' because of the 'greater attention given then before to human problems' (p.126). The main obstacles to this are overcentralisation and poor quality management. 'The right sort of establishment manager is only the beginning of industrial democracy', however (p.127). 'Shop stewards and equivalent representatives' are equally essential. 'Any attempt to by-pass the unions and their representatives, even by seemingly democratic methods, to build up a paternalism which excludes them is no democracy at all ' (p.128-9) . This allots 'a dual role to the trade union representative in the establishment, both defending the interest of workers and participating in its running. In this way, Clegg makes some concession to the contemporary human relations view at the local scale. The overall dilemma for trade unions is that while 'there can be no democracy without responsibility, the acceptance of too great a degree of responsibility will weaken and eventually destroy democracy' (p.137).
In its quiet, understated way, Industrial Democracy and Nationalization is a major and innovative contribution to revisionist social democratic thinking on IR, drawing on both political theory and in-depth empirical study of the institutions and mechanics of industry. Clegg's theoretical conclusion was striking and influential, for better or for worse.
Organised opposition is a prerequisite of democracy, at least on a large scale. Only so long as the trade unions act as an opposition to management will they serve the interests of industrial democracy (p.141)
A 'democracy of common purpose can only exist if it is contained within a larger democracy of opposition ' (p.142 
A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (1960)
This book offered the most sophisticated, fully developed and influential version of It seems to me that there are three main elements in this theory. The first is that trade unions must be independent both of the state and of management. The second is that only the unions can represent the industrial interests of workers. The third is that the ownership of industry is irrelevant to good industrial relations (p.21)
But now the political implications are more explicit. 'Conversion to this view has been one of the signs of maturity in western socialist parties' (p.27) as labour movements converge on a new social democratic consensus. The author claims, A practical and empirical creed, the creed of democracy achieved, of trade unionism which has arrived…The new theories are both pessimistic and traditional. They are rooted in distrust -distrust of power. They argue that the political and industrial institutions of stable democracies already approach the best that can be realized. They return to traditions of liberal thought which preceded the rise of socialism (p.29).
Part two consider post-war developments in light of the three principles, to test their comparative reach. Joint consultation, the main British innovation, is adjudged largely a 'failure' in its ambitions to improve productivity, IR and working conditions, though there is still 'something' to be said in its favour (p.38) even if many of the best private firms manage without it. The reasons are that consultation committees are widely bypassed, while the formal distinction between consultation and collective bargaining does not hold up in practice and it is the latter that really matters for industrial democracy. Whereas in 1951, Clegg had place some hope on 'local consultative committees' and in the face-to-face relationships of local managements and their employees, its failure at this level has been most marked ' (p.40) . Partly because 'management has not made it work', consultation is no more than an 'occasionally useful adjunct' to collective bargaining. xi In institutional terms, at least: 'it may follow that no great improvement can be made in the system of industrial relations already established in Britain' (p.41). France, by contrast, merely displays 'an inability to achieve anything like a satisfactory system of collective bargaining (p.43), due to a combination of fragmented, political trade unions, intransigent employers and an overweening state. Once again, Clegg is critical of 'the duplicity of the Communists' who 'thrive on bad relationships with management' (p.45-6), but is not prepared to get hot under the collar about it or to lay the full blame at their door.
German co-determination presents a different dilemma, since it works, yet should by his earlier theory, undermine strong independent trade unions. 'On balance, Works
Councils may have done more to strengthen the unions than to undermine them' (p.55). Clegg squares this circle, by arguing that in the special case of de-Nazification, co-determination has been a necessary route to restoring strong independent trade unions. In his view, 'collective bargaining is a process much more obviously akin to co-determination. Each is a process of arriving at joint decisions' (p.96). It works for
German workers, but countries with mature systems of collective bargaining, like
Britain and the USA, have no need of this institutional crutch. Likewise, Jugoslav
Works Councils and the Israeli Histradrut have nothing to offer countries with strong independent trade unions, but may be of benefit in less developed societies. 'In those countries devices of this sort might serve as a means of moving towards the political system of the west, the system of pressure group democracy' (p.118). Hence, Clegg is not prepared to condemn 'the Jugoslav experiment…It is a venture into the unknown, a voyage of discovery ' (p.107) . This comparative evidence suggests that two of the three principles must be applied flexibly. Trade unions can have relationships with political parties, the state and employers without forfeiting their basic independence.
Strong unions are best able to represent the interests of workers, but they may co-exist with works committees, and where unions don't exist, something is better than nothing.
Part three largely reiterates his 1951 conclusion, albeit in a more sophisticated way.
What should industrial democracy aim to achieve? First, to protect the 'rights and interest' of workers against 'those with power ' (p.83-4) Following Ostergaard, she argues that the analogy between democracy in politics and industry is invalid, since management is permanently in office, and unaccountable to anyone except, formally, to shareholders and the state. She also attacks Cleggs claim that it is impossible for workers to share directly in management, pointing out that (1) they already do in lower level management and (2) bargaining has much to say for it. Two decades later this seems far less convincing.
With hindsight, the lack of formal participation structures, underpinned by law lead to an uneven patchwork of joint regulation that was quickly and easily swept away by economic and political change after 1979. Arguably too, the lack of direct participation or 'teamworking' and emphasis on arms-length adversarial bargaining relationship damaged the cohesion and productivity of British industry compared to economies like West Germany.
And yet, as Clegg's own 1960 discussion of German co-determination made clear, while the tensions between trade unions independence and participation in management, at levels of the workplace and company, were real there was no single, clearly demarcated frontier of control. Instead, there was plenty of scope for overlap, ambiguity, blurring the borders of conflict and co-operation, without sacrificing union independence.
The fragility of trade union independence can be exaggerated…The truth is that trade unions are condemned to be the battleground of warring tendencies…in accepting responsibility in order to share power they have to realize that there is no easy formula by which power and independence may be balanced (p.99-101).
By implication the 1951 phrase, 'the trade union is an opposition which can never become a government', is misleading and simplistic. Unfortunately, it stuck, and the continuing polarisation of collective bargaining and worker participation merely legitimated institutional conservatism when reform was necessary and possible. 
